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ABSTRACT
The rise in support for Scottish independence between the 1970s 
and the 2010s has shaped Scottish politics and policy profoundly. 
The rise provokes a paradox: in this same period, the average 
educational level of people living in Scotland has also risen strongly, 
and yet, at each particular moment in time, higher levels of educa-
tion have been associated with lower levels of support for indepen-
dence. Scotland is an interesting case of wider developments. 
Recent political science theories of national populism in many 
countries would also lead us to expect that a movement for 
national sovereignty would be based mainly on the support of 
people with minimal education. Why both independence support 
and educational levels have risen is investigated using a series of 20 
surveys of the Scottish population from 1979 to 2016. Using a long- 
time series allows the effects of survey year and birth cohort to be 
disentangled, and to be interpreted in the light of educational 
expansion since the middle of the twentieth century and also the 
different periods of political socialisation of successive cohorts.
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This paper considers the intersection of two long-term trends that are profoundly 
shaping Scottish society, and that are of interest well beyond that country. The most 
visible politically is the rise in support for Scottish independence, from fewer than one in 
10 people in the 1970s to a quarter around the turn of the century, nearly a half in the 
referendum on the subject that was held in 2014, and over a half in many opinion polls 
since 2020. The other trend is common everywhere: the rising amounts of formal 
education across cohorts born between the beginning of the twentieth century and its 
last decade. The point of departure for the analysis in this paper is then a paradox arising 
from these two trends. Support for independence has been higher among people with 
minimal formal education than among people with advanced education. Support has also 
been higher among the young than the old. Yet the young have far greater amounts of 
formal education than the old.
Scotland is a potentially interesting case study of much wider developments, for three 
main reasons. The first is that Scottish nationalism may be interpreted as an instance of 
the growing political awareness of national sovereignty across Europe in recent decades, 
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some of it – as in Scotland – expressed as a rebellion against the states that had been 
inherited from the middle of the twentieth century or earlier. The second reason is that 
the ideological basis of national assertion has varied among cases, even though most 
recent discussion has been of the politically right-of-centre kind, such as in Hungary and 
Poland. Scotland provides an instance of predominantly left-of-centre nationalism, in 
common with Wales, Catalonia, and also, outside Europe, recently in Quebec. Some 
instances of national assertion have had an ambiguous ideological basis, such as the 
campaign for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, which, though pre-
dominantly on the right, has always had a significant element of support on the left. The 
fact that all these societies have seen a massive rise in educational participation since the 
middle of the twentieth century is the third reason. The Scottish case can be taken as a 
specific test of the common view (discussed in the next section) that recent versions of 
nationalism, interpreted as one kind of populism, have drawn their main support from 
people with minimal education.
The movement for Scottish independence may be traced back to the 1930s, with the 
founding of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in 1934. It was the sole credible political 
party of independence until the 1970s, and remains by far the dominant influence in the 
independence campaign (Mitchell, Bennie, and Johns 2012). The party had little sus-
tained impact in the immediate post-war period, when the allegiance to Britain was 
strong, not only because of the experience of war but also because the welfare state was a 
common British undertaking that, it was widely felt, Scotland could not have afforded on 
its own. The SNP’s first sustained electoral impact was in the period when this post-war 
consensus began to break down, in the late-1960s and mid-1970s, prompting the UK 
Labour government of the 1970s to seek to set up an elected Scottish assembly with 
relatively weak powers. In a referendum of 1979, this was endorsed by 52% of those 
voting, but, because that did not reach the threshold of 40% of the whole Scottish 
electorate that had been stipulated by the UK parliament, the assembly was not 
established.
Nevertheless, the legacy of these 1970s debates led to growing support for some kind 
of elected assembly or parliament in the 1980s and 1990s (Brown, McCrone, and 
Paterson 1998). The support was partly based on nationalism, and always had some 
association with a sense of Scotland’s distinctive identity, but there was also a strengthen-
ing view that the case for devolution could be made on the grounds of good governance 
and of modernising UK democracy more generally (Keating 2010; Paterson 1998). There 
was a growing association of support for devolution with broadly left-wing political views 
on policy, partly because support for the UK Conservative Party steadily declined in 
Scotland even while the party remained dominant in the UK parliament. That contrast 
was influential in persuading the Labour Party to support devolution with few reserva-
tions. Following these ideological trends, and partly encouraging them, the SNP moved 
to the left (Jackson 2020). The UK Labour government elected in 1997 held a second 
referendum in 1997 on new proposals for a more powerful parliament than the assembly 
that had been proposed in 1979. The endorsement this time was strong, with 74% voting 
in favour. The parliament was first elected in 1999.
The first two devolved governments were coalitions of Labour and the centrist Liberal 
Democrats, but they were defeated in the 2007 election by the SNP. That party then won 
an absolute majority of seats in the 2011 election, an unusual achievement in a broadly 
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proportional electoral system. The UK government of the time accepted that this was a 
mandate for a referendum on independence, which was held in September 2014. The 
SNP was the main proponent of independence in that campaign, but significant currents 
of support came from the Scottish Green Party and from an alliance of left-wing groups 
in the Radical Independence Campaign (Jackson 2020). This left-wing tenor of the 
campaign for independence was aided by the SNP government’s broad ideological 
position as social democratic (including on education: Arnott and Ozga 2016). The 
support for independence in the referendum was 45%, which, although short of a 
majority, was higher than in any survey up to the early summer of 2014. The SNP 
subsequently received the support of almost all of those who had voted for independence, 
allowing it to win almost all Scottish seats in the UK parliamentary election of 2015, and 
to win the Scottish parliament elections of 2016 and 2021. Independence support 
remained at the level achieved in the referendum, and slowly grew, partly in response 
to the result of the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union 
(EU), in which a UK majority of 52% voted to leave but a Scottish majority of 62% voted 
to stay. During the disruption caused by Covid-19 in 2020, most opinion polls gave 
independence a slight majority (What Scotland Thinks 2021).
The purpose of the present analysis is to understand how the changing levels of 
support for independence relate to the changing levels of education in the Scottish 
electorate over the long period from the time of the first referendum on a devolved 
assembly, in 1979, to the aftermath of the 2014 referendum on independence. In doing 
this, we distinguish between chronological time (1979–2016) and birth cohort (early 20th 
century to early-1990s), because the main influence on the amount of education which 
people have had is the period when they were born. Although the purpose of the analysis 
is not to investigate all the influences on independence support (for which see, for 
example, Scholes and Curtice 2020), we do also consider how the conclusions in relation 
to education are affected by the two influences that previous research has shown to be the 
strongest, personal national identity and expectations relating to the economic prospects 
of an independent Scotland. All the analysis is carried out separately for men and women, 
because women have historically had lower levels of support for independence and also, 
for people born in the 1960s and later, higher levels of educational attainment.
The paper is in four further parts. The next section sets the case of education and 
Scottish independence in the context of wider debates about education and attitudes to 
national sovereignty. The data and methods used in the analysis are described in the 
section after that, followed by the empirical results. The final section relates these findings 
to the wider debates.
Education and attitudes to national sovereignty
In recent academic writing, two dominant stories have been told about the relationship 
between education and liberal democracy. One blames educated elites for provoking 
nationalist rebellions against liberalism and globalisation. The other, in radical contrast, 
points to education’s encouragement for what are usually portrayed as the antithesis of 
these resentments: liberal tolerance, preference for international cooperation over 
national sovereignty, and distrust of nationalism. Neither of these stories fully describes 
JOURNAL OF EDUCATION POLICY 3
recent Scottish experience of nationalism, and both raise some paradoxical questions 
about how to reconcile the growth in support for Scottish independence with the growth 
in levels of education.
One of the best-known pieces of evidence cited by the first story is a comment from the 
UK Cabinet Minister Michael Gove during the campaign that led to the referendum on the 
UK’s membership of the EU: ‘people in this country have had enough of experts from 
organisations with acronyms’ (Full Fact 2016). Often mis-quoted as being an attack on 
expertise per se, this actually more subtle point succinctly encapsulates a rebellion against 
the power exercised by highly educated elites in powerful institutions. The same sentiment 
can be found in academic analysis that is canonical in educational research, notably in the 
tradition of thought deriving from Bourdieu and Passeron (1977, 123). Education, in this 
view, confers power through the habitus of the institutions where the highly educated work. 
Modern elites form increasingly closed cultural groups because of merit-selection, which 
has allegedly come to be a means by which advantage is reproduced rather than opened to 
wider social groups (Sandel 2020, 155–95; Wooldridge 2021, 306–28).
The disparate rebellions against this structure of power have been called ‘national 
populism’ by Eatwell and Goodwin (2018, xxi-xxii), protests fuelled by a ‘distrust of 
politicians and institutions’, by relative social deprivation, by the loosening of ties to 
established political parties, and by a sense of the ‘destruction of the national group’s 
historic identity and established ways of life’. The most prominent instances interna-
tionally are the UK vote to leave the European Union, and the election of Donald Trump 
as president of the USA in 2016, but there are electorally strong instances also in France, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden, Hungary and Poland. Eatwell and Goodwin point out (25–27) 
that education is ‘one of major fault lines that runs beneath national populism across the 
West’, noting that, for example, in the 2016 EU referendum the ‘educational divide’ was 
greater than those by class, income, or age.
Other writers have made similar points. Goodhart (2017, 23–24) describes the oppo-
nents of Brexit as being typically a ‘liberally-inclined graduate’. Curtice (2017) noted that 
‘support for Leave [in the 2016 referendum] and a hard Brexit is much higher amongst 
those with few, if any, educational qualifications than it is amongst university graduates’. 
Silver (2016) and Mounk (2018, 190) make similar points about the election of Donald 
Tump. Runciman (2018, 164) sums up this interpretation in a way that takes us back to 
the habitus of elites: ‘the educated mistake their [own] tribalism for superior wisdom’.
Scottish nationalism might appear to offer a straightforward further instance of this 
first story. Goodhart (2017, 53) draws the obvious parallel with Brexit:
Brexit was a movement to reclaim control/sovereignty from a supranational EU and the 
SNP is a movement to reclaim control/sovereignty from a multinational United Kingdom.
Although Eatwell and Goodwin (2018, 79) distinguish between ‘populist nationalism’, 
in which they include the SNP, and ‘national populism’, the difference is a matter of 
emphasis rather than substance. Support for Scottish independence fits most authors’ 
definitions of populism. For example, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012, 8) define populism 
as ‘a confrontation between “the people” and “the establishment”’. In the Scottish case, 
this contrast is between the people of Scotland and the UK political establishment in 
London. That is why it seems reasonable for Norris and Inglehart (2019: 486) to classify 
the SNP as a left-wing populist party.
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Nevertheless, difficulties of classifying the Scottish case arise because the ideology of 
Scottish nationalism has generally been civic rather than ethnic (Jackson 2020; McCrone 
1998). That then brings us to the second of the two academic stories about the relationship 
between education and democracy. This one is far older than the recent responses to 
populism, in some ways going right back to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and 
including many of the nineteenth-century arguments for extending compulsory schooling 
as the necessary basis of extending the franchise. The ways in which education might support 
democracy were summed up by Lipset in 1960: education ‘broadens [citizens’] outlook, 
enables [them] to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains [them] from adhering 
to extremist doctrines, and increases [their] capacity to make rational electoral choices’ 
(quoted by Rindermann 2008, 308). Pinker (2012) and Welzel (2013)attribute the growth 
of peaceful civilisation to the extension of education. Education encourages critical thinking 
(Gutmann 1987), especially among adults (Egerton 2002; Bynner, Schuller, and Feinstein 
2003) and independent ideas (Campbell 2006; Persson 2015; Rindermann 2008). It fosters 
liberal attitudes (Nie and Hillygus 2001; Stubagar, 2008; Surridge 2016; Van De Werfhorst 
and de Graaf 2004). It enables people to choose cultural allegiance, unconstrained by their 
social origins (Nieuwbeerta, de Graaf, and Ultee 2000; Paterson 2008).
Moreover, because nearly all citizens of the developed democracies now have at least a 
decade of schooling (up to mid-secondary school), and a majority have more than that, it is 
inaccurate to describe the ‘education divide’ as setting the uneducated against the educated. 
With the intellectual resources provided by education, those who rebel against elites, it may 
be argued, are perfectly capable of making that choice on the basis of educated rationality, a 
situation that, as Müller (2016, 7–10) points out, is not adequately captured by the term 
‘populism’. Curtice (2014), indeed, has repeatedly shown that the two most powerful 
influences on people’s choice in 2014 were a combination of the affective and the rational: 
the power of one of these, national identity, may be thought to be consistent with the 
theories of national populism, but the influence of how people saw the economic prospects 
of an independent Scotland seemed the epitome of rational calculation.
This alternative view of the importance of rational evaluation of constitutional options 
has indeed been a strong current in Scottish nationalism, certainly in the long campaign for 
some kind of elected parliament when the case for devolution was made partly on the basis 
of liberal reform to the UK state (Paterson 1998). Because devolution quickly became the 
settled consensus after 1999, there did emerge a new political tension between the suppor-
ters of this new status quo – who were generally well-educated and well-connected – and 
the nationalist opposition that wanted to take the powers of the parliament further 
(McCrone 2019; Paterson 2009a). But the movement for Scottish independence, precisely 
because it had been on the left politically since the 1970s, has always had the capacity to 
attract to it the rebellious instincts of the young and educated (Jackson 2020). The 
prominence of young activists with university degrees was a widely noted feature of the 
campaigning for independence in the 2014 referendum (Crowther 2018; Paterson 2015). 
Moreover, whereas men had previously shown higher levels of support for independence 
than women (McCrone and Paterson 2002), there was some evidence that this sex 
difference may have weakened as independence support rose in the youngest cohorts.
Previous research has investigated the demographic and educational aspects of this 
change, but not linked them. The weakening statistical effects of education on support for 
independence has been noted by Merino (2020) and by Eichhorn and Paterson (2014), 
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but without relating this to age (or, equivalently, to the cohort in which people received 
their main education). The importance of birth cohort in explaining support for inde-
pendence has been analysed by Schneider (2014), but without considering any possibly 
varying effects of education (and her analysis used data only up to 2012).
Thus for our analysis here there are three broad research questions, each of which we 
consider separately for men and women:
● How has any association between education and support for independence changed 
over the four decades from 1979 to 2016?
● How did any such changing association vary by birth cohort?
● How did the relationship between education and support for independence vary 




The data come from Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys and the Scottish Election Surveys. 
The attitudes survey has run almost every year from 1999, with the sole exception of 
2008; we use 1999–2016. The target sample in each year was selected from the postcode 
address file and designed to be representative of all people eligible to vote. The election 
surveys were supplements to the British Election Surveys of 1997, 1992 and 1979, using 
the postcode address file for 1997 and the electoral register for 1992 and 1979. The 
designs were similar to those later used in the attitudes surveys. For all the surveys from 
1997 onwards, the sampling used multi-stage clusters, stratified at the cluster level. All 
but the 1979 and 1992 data sets include weights in order to take account of the cluster 
sampling and to make the data representative with respect to sex and age. We use only 
respondents who were aged 25 or over at the date of survey, in order to have a reasonably 
complete estimate of their initial education.
The surveys were mainly funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council, 
with further funding for specific modules of questions from the Scottish government and 
various research charities. The administration of the surveys by ScotCen Social Research, 
and by previous similar organisations, was wholly independent of the funders. Further 
details of all these surveys are in Curtice et al. (2002: Appendix) and ScotCen (2021). The 
data were obtained from the UK Data Archive.
The questionnaires were administered by interviewers in respondents’ homes, com-
puter-aided from 1997. They covered the full range of topical political issues and also 
collected demographic information on respondents. We use six variables. Sex was 
recorded dichotomously in all surveys. The other variables are:
Birth cohort
In all but the 1979 survey, this is derived from respondent’s age at the time of the 
fieldwork; in 1979, it came from a question about year of birth. The cohorts, each a 
decade long (except the oldest and youngest), are shown in Table 1 with a brief summary 
of the main educational and political contexts for respondents who grew up in the UK. 
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From the surveys where a relevant question was asked (2006–14), at least 90% of 
respondents were indeed born in the UK; we retain in the analysis people who were 
not born in the UK because they were mostly eligible to vote in the 2014 referendum. 
Similar periods to define cohorts have been used in research by previous writers on the 
impact of educational change in the UK (for example, Iannelli and Paterson 2006).
Education
This is the highest level of educational attainment at the survey date, shown in Table 2. For 
purposes of analysis, in order to have adequate sample sizes in small cells, the levels are 
grouped into three categories: higher education, full secondary education, and incomplete 
secondary education or lower. Cases with missing data on education are omitted from all 
the analysis (around 2% of cases in every year except 1979, when it was 4%).
Support for Independence
In all the surveys, a question was asked about the respondent’s preferred constitutional 
arrangement. From 1997 to 2016, the offered categories were: independence outside the 
EU, independence in the EU, devolution with taxation powers, devolution without 
taxation powers, and no elected parliament. The 1992 wording options were similar, 
but omitting the distinction of devolution with and without taxation. For all these years, 
support for independence is defined here to be choosing one of the first two options. In 
1979, only one independence option was offered, along with a parliament responsible for 
most Scottish affairs, an assembly responsible for some affairs, and no elected assembly. 
Independence support in 1979 is defined to be that unique option. This approach to 
defining support for independence is consistent with previous research (McCrone and 
Paterson 2002).
National identity
This has been asked about in a variety of ways, but the only reasonably consistent version 
that allows 1979 to be included is what has been called ‘forced choice national identity’: 
respondents were asked to choose the identity that best described them, from the list: 




secondary school Educational context in Britain Age 18
Political socialisation in 
Scotland
Secondary Higher
−1926 −1938 Selective; wartime elite −1944 Pre-war and war
1927– 
36










1959–68 Beginnings of non- 
selective
1960s expansion 1965– 
74































Second rise of SNP
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British, Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish, Irish, European, and Other. In every year, at least 
88% of people chose either Scottish or British, and so we group this variable into these 
two categories and a category ‘other’.
Economic expectations of Independence
In 2013 and 2014 only, respondents were asked how independence would affect the 
Scottish economy, with a five-point response scale from ‘a lot better’ to ‘a lot worse’. 
Because this variable has been shown to have been strongly associated with voting for or 
against independence in the 2014 referendum, it is included in models restricted to these 
two years to assess how it interacts with education.
After the missing values on the education variable are omitted, the size of the samples 
used in the analysis are as shown in Table 2, a total of 25,128 respondents.
Statistical models
All the models are logistic regressions, in most of which the dependent variable is 
whether or not the respondent supported independence. One model also has the depen-
dent variable as whether or not the respondent identifies as Scottish. The modelling was 
done in the statistical environment R, using the function ‘svyglm’ from the ‘survey’ 
package in order to be able to include the weights. The explanatory variables are sex, 
education, year of survey, birth cohort, and, where appropriate, national identity and 
economic expectations. These are entered as categorical variables, and as interactive 
effects among them.











Lower than mid- 
secondary None
1979 5 4 19 18 2 51 612
1992 5 13 13 19 9 41 811
1997 9 14 14 19 8 35 780
1999 14 15 11 17 7 36 1,355
2000 14 15 11 18 7 34 1,499
2001 15 16 9 14 12 34 1,459
2002 13 17 15 11 15 29 1,524
2003 16 16 14 11 16 27 1,375
2004 19 11 15 15 13 28 1,490
2005 20 14 16 14 12 24 1,416
2006 20 12 16 14 12 25 1,447
2007 22 15 15 15 9 25 1,369
2009 20 15 15 17 11 22 1,374
2010 21 15 16 15 10 22 1,360
2011 24 13 17 15 8 22 1,093
2012 23 15 19 13 9 20 1,119
2013 24 14 14 16 9 23 1,376
2014 26 15 18 14 7 21 1,368
2015 24 16 18 13 7 21 1,181
2016 25 15 16 15 8 20 1,120
Percentage in rows. 
aFor example, Higher Grade or A-level 
bFor example, Standard Grade, O Grade or O level.
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For most purposes, the interactive affects are straightforward to include, but there is a 
complication for the interaction of year and cohort. Only the first four cohorts appear in 
all the surveys. Respondents in the two cohorts from 1957 to 1976 appear in all but the 
1979 survey, because, in that year, even the oldest person from these cohorts (aged 22) 
did not reach the threshold of age 25. The 1977–86 cohort appears in 2002–16, and the 
1987–91 cohort only in 2012–16. Therefore, to model the interactive effect of year and 
cohort, it was necessary explicitly to exclude terms that corresponded to empty cells in 
the full year-by-cohort table. For example, there was no term representing the interaction 
of the 1957–66 cohort and the year 1979. Thus, the total number of degrees of freedom 
for this interactive effect was 110, not 133 as it would have been if there were no empty 
cells. Using multiple cross-sectional surveys to disentangle the effects of survey year and 
birth cohort has been shown by previous researchers to clarify educational change over 
time (Breen et al. 2009; Ganzeboom and Treiman 1993).
The statistical effects of each term in the model are shown in summary tables in the 
online supplementary material. The main results are reported as predicted proportions 
supporting independence (or identifying as Scottish), mainly by means of graphs. In 
these graphs, as well as omitting the combinations of year and cohort that have been 
excluded from the models, we also omitted the two final years for the oldest cohort (born 
in 1926 or earlier), and the first year for each of the two youngest cohorts, because the 
sample numbers in these combinations of year and cohort were very small (20 or fewer). 
Where predictions are compared in the text, the appropriate standard errors are derived 
from the full covariance matrix of the predictions (‘vcov’ in R).
Analysis
The aim of the statistical analysis is to assess the competing claims which may be summed 
up thus:
● is support for Scottish independence an instance of national populism, a rebellion 
against educated elites by people with little formal education and a strong attach-
ment to national identity, especially older people?
● or is independence support a rebellion by the young and educated, especially against 
a unionism that is associated with older generations who grew to maturity in the 
stable welfare state after the Second World War?
The surveys record the long-term growth in support for independence, which has 
been in two main phases, as shown in Figure 1 separately for men and women. The first 
was during the long period of Conservative government in the 1980s and 1990s, when 
support rose from one in ten to one in three. There was then broad stability after the 
setting up of the Scottish parliament in 1999, with brief spikes upwards when the SNP 
achieved an overall majority in the election of 2011, and also in 2004–5 in advance of 
their first electoral victory in 2007. The second sustained rise was around and after the 
2014 referendum, reaching well over 40%.
At any particular point in time, moreover, independence support has been higher 
among younger people than among older. We investigate this more thoroughly below, 
but Figure 2 illustrates this gradient for the period around the referendum in 2014 (years 
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2013–16). It omits the oldest cohort (born before 1927) because its sample numbers in 
these years were very small. Even at the time of the referendum, independence support 
among people born before or around the Second World War is only a half that of people 
born in the last quarter of the century.
This same period also saw a large change in the distribution of educational attainment 
(Table 2). The most notable feature across the different surveys is the rise in the 
proportion with a higher-education qualification, from 9% in 1979, through 29% in 
1999, 35% in 2009, to 40% in 2016. There was a large fall in the proportion with low or no 
formal attainment, from 53% in 1979 to 28% in 2016. These educational trends are even 
clearer when recorded by decade of birth. The proportion with a higher education 
qualification among the oldest cohorts is inflated by differential mortality (because 
people with high amounts of education tend to live longer). Nevertheless, even among 
surviving people in 2013–16, Table 3 reflects the growth of education across the cohorts: 
higher education rises from 11% to 53%, and low or no formal attainment falls from 70% 
to 16%.
The relationship of support for independence to education has changed over the 
surveys. The model is summarised in Table A1 (supplementary material), with predicted 
values in Figure 3. Until about 2011, the proportion who support independence is lower 
among people with a higher-education qualification than in the other two categories. The 
evidence is not conclusive for 1979 and 1992 because the overall level of support for 
independence is quite low, but the difference among education categories then grew 
because independence support was unchanged or fell among people with higher educa-
tion, while it rose in the other two education categories. Thus, on average in the period 
1997–2003, for both men and women, independence support was 10 points higher 
among people with low or no attainment than among people with higher education 
(p < 0.001). The difference between secondary education and low or no attainment was 
3.8 points (p = 0.04 for men and p = 0.02 for women). This average difference remained 
similar until 2011, despite the fluctuation upwards in 2005, but then there was 
Figure 1. Percentage supporting Independence, by year of survey and sex, 1979–2016.
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convergence at a high level of independence support: from 2012 to 2016, the three 
education categories were separated by at most 2 points for both men and women 
(p > 0.3 for each comparison).
So, Figure 3 seems to show an unprecedented combination after 2012 of a high and 
growing level of support for independence with the end of any association between that 
support and educational attainment. There are two broad possible explanations here. 
One is generational replacement. Both independence support and educational attain-
ment have risen across birth cohorts. So if the association of education with indepen-
dence support is weaker in younger cohorts, then, as they have come gradually to be 
numerically dominant, so also will that association decline over the population as a 
whole. The other explanation would be simpler: after 2012, support for independence 
might have risen more rapidly among people with higher education regardless of when 
they were born.
Figure 2. Percentage supporting Independence, by birth cohort and sex, restricted to survey years 
2013–16.










Lower than mid- 
secondary None
−1926 2 9 12 7 8 62
1927–36 8 8 11 9 13 50
1937–46 11 12 11 11 15 40
1947–56 20 17 15 12 9 27
1957–66 22 15 20 20 7 16
1967–76 30 19 16 16 6 12
1977–86 38 15 21 13 2 11
1987–91 39 14 13 19 9 7
Percentage in rows. 
aFor example, Higher Grade or A-level 
bFor example, Standard Grade, O Grade or O level.
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To disentangle these effects, we model independence support in terms of year, birth 
cohort, sex and educational attainment. The summary is in Table A2 (supplementary 
material). There were broadly four types of pattern with respect to birth cohort, shown in 
the four pairs of graphs in Figures 4,5,6 and 7. Figure 4 shows the two oldest cohorts 
(born up to 1926, and 1927–36). For both men and women, there was a rise in support for 
independence between 1979 and 1997 at all levels of education, but most sharply for 
people with low or no formal attainment. That pattern broadly persisted for the following 
decade, but then support declined, when the educational differences declined too. The 
pattern for these oldest cohorts at or around the referendum was thus barely different 
from the situation four decades earlier.
In contrast, in the graphs for all cohorts born from 1937 onward, there is a simple 
conclusion: there was a rise in support for independence at all levels of education. This 
rise is greater than any differences among cohorts in the association of independence 
with education. In these cohorts, the level of support in 2016 among people with higher 
education is at least as great as the support among people with low or no formal 
attainment in the 1990s. Indeed, for the two youngest cohorts, these graduates had higher 
levels of independence support in 2016 than was found amongst those with low or no 
formal attainment as recently as 2011.
The nuances of the graphs merely modify these broad trends. People born from 1937 
to 1956, shown in Figure 5, had a pattern similar to that shown in Figure 3 – a rise at all 
levels of education in the 1980s and 1990s, stable differences among the education 
categories from then till around 2011, and then a convergence of the education categories 
at and after the referendum. For people born from 1957 to 1976, the pattern from 1992 
onwards is shown in Figure 6: support was consistently high, and the education differ-
ences were stable. For example, for the cohort 1967–76, the difference in 2012–16 
between the higher-education category and the category of low or no attainment was 
8.7 points for men (p = 0.01) and 11 points for women (p < 0.001).
Figure 3. Predicted percentage supporting Independence, by year of survey, sex and education, 1979– 
2016. Source: predicted values from model in Table A1.
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The youngest cohorts are shown in Figure 7, starting at the first survey where reason-
ably large sample sizes were available for these cohorts. For all education categories, there 
was a rise to 50% or higher. In the youngest cohort, the category of secondary education 
overtook that of low or no education.
So the convergence of independence support among the education categories which 
was evident in Figure 3 is due to two different trends. One is indeed convergence within 
the four older cohorts – downwards for the oldest cohorts (born up to 1936), and 
Figure 4. Predicted percentage supporting independence, by year of survey, sex, birth cohort, and 
education: birth cohorts -1926 and 1927–36 Source: predicted values from model in Table A2. The 
graphs for the cohort ‘-1926’ are truncated at year 2014 because of very small sample numbers for that 
cohort after that date.
Figure 5. Predicted percentage supporting Independence, by year of survey, sex, birth cohort, and 
education: birth cohorts 1937–46 and 1947–56. Source: predicted values from model in Table A2.
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upwards for the wartime and first post-war cohorts (1937–56). But there was no such 
educational convergence for the four younger cohorts (born from 1957 onwards): all 
education categories showed a rise. Because many more people in these younger cohorts 
(especially the very youngest) had higher education, the overall effect during the period 
2013–16 was to shift the higher-education category in the population as a whole towards 
independence support.
Figure 6. Predicted percentage supporting Independence, by year of survey, sex, birth cohort, and 
education: birth cohorts 1957–66 and 1967–76, and years 1992–2016. Source: predicted values from 
model in Table A2.
Figure 7. Predicted percentage supporting Independence, by year of survey, sex, birth cohort, and 
education: birth cohorts 1977–86 and 1987–91, and years 2003–16. Source: predicted values from 
model in Table A2.
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The combined effect of these disparate cohort trends was that the educational basis of 
independence support rose over time. As late as 2004, more than 40% of independence 
supporters had low or no formal attainment and only a quarter had higher education. By 
2014 and later, the position had reversed (respectively a quarter and over 40%). The 
graduates in 2016 were very much younger, coming from the independence-supporting 
generation: 32% had been born since 1977, and 58% since 1967, in contrast to only 6% 
and 32% in 2004.
A further clue to how this change in the educational basis of independence support 
came about is in the relationship of both of these variables to national identity. The 
statistical model which includes a measure of identity is summarised in Table A3 
(supplementary material). For people with a Scottish identity, independence support 
around the time of the referendum was very similar in the different education categories, 
as Figure 8 shows for three selected cohorts. (It should be emphasised that the restriction 
to three cohorts is for purposes of illustration: the model included all cohorts.) This is 
true even for cohorts such as 1957–66 in this graph, where there were persistent 
differences with respect to education in Figure 6. For example, in that cohort in the 
years 2013–16, the difference of independence support between women with a higher 
education and women with low or no formal attainment was 12 points in Figure 6 (not 
controlling for identity), but 7.9 points among people who called themselves Scottish 
(Figure 8). Among men, the analogous differences were 10 and 3.2. For people with a 
British identity, by contrast, as well as independence support being generally at a lower 
level than among people with a Scottish identity, it was also lower among people with 
higher or secondary education than among people with low or no formal education, as 
Figure 9 shows for the same three selected cohorts.
A partial explanation of these results for Scottish identity is that national identity is 
itself related to education. Consistently across the years, the proportion of people with a 
Scottish identity was somewhat lower among people whose attainment was higher; the 
educational gradient with respect to British identity was the reverse. But these education 
Figure 8. Predicted percentage supporting Independence among people with Scottish identity, by 
year of survey, sex, birth cohort, and education: birth cohorts 1927–36, 1957–66, and 1977–86. Source: 
predicted values from model in Table A3.
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gradients did not change over time, and were never very strong (confirming a conclusion 
reached by Bechhofer and McCrone (2009)). Figure 10 shows the pattern for Scottish 
identity with the same three selected cohorts as in Figures 8 and 9 (corresponding to the 
model in Table A4 (supplementary material)). Moreover, in the youngest cohort here the 
higher-education category no longer had the lowest proportion identifying as Scottish. 
The generally weak association of national identity with education has meant that having 
more graduates has not shifted identity away from Scottishness. One consequence of this 
is that a large part of the growth of support for independence is due to graduates who call 
themselves Scottish. Of all independence supporters in 2016, 32% were graduates with a 
Scottish identity, and this was larger than any of the other groups defined by attainment 
and identity: 28% were Scottish with secondary education, 23% were Scottish with low or 
no formal attainment, and the remaining 17% were from the other combinations of 
national identity and education. The percentage of independence supporters who were 
graduates with a Scottish identity was up from 23% a decade earlier, 12% in 1997, and a 
mere 7% in 1979.
The previous research that was cited earlier found that, as well as national identity, the 
strongest predictor of voting for independence in the referendum was having a favour-
able view of an independent Scotland’s economic prospects. A question about that was 
asked in the surveys of 2013–14. However, this economic evaluation was only weakly 
related to education, and so the residual association with education after controlling for it 
was similar to that in Figure 8. The details are shown in Table A6 and Figures A1 and A2 
in the supplementary material. As with national identity, then, the importance of educa-
tion is less than the influence of people’s beliefs.
In summary of the analysis, we can conclude that there is no clear evidence that people 
with low or no formal education were disproportionately likely to support independence 
in recent years as it has grown in popularity. In fact, that growth can be attributed in large 
part to graduates who identify as Scottish. Nor is the growth because of older cohorts, 
whether educated or not. In fact, some of the largest rise in support for independence was 
Figure 9. Predicted percentage supporting Independence among people with British identity, by year 
of survey, sex, birth cohort, and education: birth cohorts 1927–36, 1957–66, and 1977–86. Source: 
predicted values from model in Table A3.
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for people born in the 1950s and 1960s, the post-war cohorts. Younger cohorts had high 
levels of support from the time they reached voting age. Low-educated people in the 
cohort born before or around the war did show some increase in support in the 1990s, 
but this fell away when the campaigning for the 2014 referendum became salient, and 
graduates in these older cohorts always had low levels of support.
Some of the association with education is explained by national identity, which may 
thus be thought of as one way in which education is translated into views about 
independence. There were more young graduates than ever before, and, although they 
were no more likely than their predecessors to choose a Scottish identity, they were more 
likely to translate that into support for independence.
In short, if the movement for Scottish independence is a rebellion against elites, it is 
not based on the low-educated or the old.
Conclusions
The main strength of the analysis reported here has been the length of the time 
period it has covered, from the late-1970s to the period after the referendum on 
Scottish independence in 2014. This was a period of very great political change, with 
growing electoral divergence between Scotland and England, with the setting up of a 
powerful elected Scottish parliament, with the unprecedented growth of the main 
party supporting independence, and with support for independence itself rising 
from under one in ten to around one half, and well over a half of people born 
since the 1980s. The use of repeated surveys has allowed the disentangling of the 
effects of year and birth cohort. The same period and cohorts also recorded a 
transformation of educational attainment, with the proportion having a higher- 
education qualification rising from an elite of under 10% to nearly a majority in 
people born after the mid-1980s.
Figure 10. Predicted percentage with Scottish identity, by year of survey, sex, birth cohort, and 
education: birth cohorts 1927–36, 1957–66, and 1977–86. Source: predicted values from model in 
Table A4.
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The main weakness is that there are no sources of data that track individuals over time. 
Our use of repeated birth cohorts over 20 surveys is only an approximation to that ideal 
design, and proper investigation of motives and beliefs would require a variety of 
methods to investigate life histories. We have also had to compromise on a rather general 
measure of educational attainment, recording level rather than content. In particular, it 
would be valuable to know whether there are differences in any educational effects on 
attitudes to independence between having studied social science or humanities on the 
one hand, or science and technology on the other. Previous research has shown that the 
propensity of education to foster democratic attitudes is stronger in the former than in 
the latter (Paterson 2009b). Moreover, despite using 20 surveys that include over 25,000 
individuals, there is not enough data to break down the year-by-cohort-by-education 
interactive effect by further demographic characteristics such as social class, ethnicity, 
religion or region within Scotland.
Nevertheless, there was enough statistical power in the data to allow the varying effects 
of education to be traced over time and separately for women and men, enabling the 
analysis to offer some answers to the apparent paradox that we started with. Support for 
independence has risen even in a population where there has been an increase in the size 
of educated groups that, historically, have had least support for independence. Until the 
period around the referendum, there was a clear gradient of independence support across 
the educational categories, probably in fact widening in the first decade after the Scottish 
parliament was established in 1999. But from 2012, there was unprecedented narrowing.
Part of the explanation is the differences among birth cohorts. The oldest cohorts – 
born before the Second World War – never had high support. It was not negligible 
among low attainers in these cohorts, but even that died away as the referendum 
approached, falling to no more than about one in five. These are the cohorts who 
experienced the British solidarity of the war mostly as adolescents or adults, and who, 
as voters and workers, contributed to creating the welfare state. This point about the war 
cohorts has been made by many previous writers, but what we can now see is that their 
growing opposition to independence in 2014 was, compared to earlier, especially a matter 
of the low attainers among them, who were by far their majority.
The other cohorts all showed a rise in support for independence around the refer-
endum, or the maintenance of an already high level of support. Support in the wartime 
and post-war generation (born 1937–56) moved upwards, at all levels of education, as the 
referendum approached. The next cohorts, born 1957–76, showed high support even in 
the 1990s, and remained there, but with little change in the educational differences. These 
cohorts’ first experience of politics was during the collapse of the post-war settlement in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and the growing alienation of the Scottish polity from the govern-
ments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major. But these cohorts were not young enough 
to experience mass higher education, and so some of the historical educational hierarchy 
of attitudes remained. Thus, by the referendum, although support for independence 
among higher-education graduates in these cohorts had reached 40%, that was still 
clearly less than among those with minimal education, where it was over 50%. That 
educational pattern changed clearly in the youngest cohorts, who were born mainly in the 
1980s, and who came to political maturity after the Scottish parliament was established in 
1999. The education gap was consistently smaller, and may have been reversed. Support 
among even those with higher education reached over 50%.
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The main summary point about independence support at different levels of education 
is then that the overall convergence around the time of the referendum was mainly due to 
generational replacement – to the electorate’s gradually comprising more young people 
with more education who also were more likely than older cohorts to support indepen-
dence. The only birth cohorts within which there was an upwards convergence among 
educational categories over time were those born in the third quarter of the twentieth 
century. There was also a convergence in people older than that, but it was downwards.
But that was not the whole story either, because the effect of national identity out-
weighed education. Among people with a Scottish identity, there was almost no educa-
tional effect at the time of the referendum. Holding a Scottish identity was high in all 
educational categories, even as higher education expanded. So, the demographic basis of 
independence support shifted to being predominantly graduates with a Scottish identity, 
who made up one-third of all independence supporters.
On the wider theories about national populism and attitudes to national sovereignty 
we can therefore say that they simply do not work for the case of Scotland. The education 
gap even as recently as the first decade of the present century might originally have 
suggested that these theories were relevant, but the gap has diminished as independence 
support has grown. Moreover, support for independence among the young is far greater 
than among the old, at all levels of education, in stark contrast to the support for Brexit in 
England. At these very different levels of overall support, the education gap in 2014 was 
low among both the young (born in the last quarter of the twentieth century) and the old 
(born before the war). Only for people born in the third quarter of the century was the 
education gap quite stable (Figure 6), and so only for that specific generation does the 
theory of national populism have some persisting relevance, but, even there, this did not 
prevent graduates showing a steady rise in support from about 2010–12 onwards.
The Scottish case may thus show that general terms such as ‘populism’ are inadequate to 
explain attitudes to national sovereignty. In some countries, support for national sovereignty 
undoubtedly is associated with older people who have little formal education. But in Scotland 
the association has come to be almost the opposite, and allegiance to a national identity that 
has come to be felt to be in opposition to the existing state elites is common across all 
educational categories. The single word ‘populism’ does not capture this complexity.
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